Changing Shanghai's "mind": publicity, reform, and the British in Shanghai, 1928-1931 by Bickers, R A
                          Bickers, R. A. (1992). Changing Shanghai's "mind": publicity, reform, and
the British in Shanghai, 1928-1931. (pp. 33 p). (China Society occasional
papers), (26). China Society.
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Take down policy
Explore Bristol Research is a digital archive and the intention is that deposited content should not be
removed. However, if you believe that this version of the work breaches copyright law please contact
open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an
initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question
from public view.
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changing Shanghai’s ‘Mind’ 
Publicity, reform and the British in Shanghai, 
1928-1931 
 
A lecture given at a meeting of the China society  
on March 20th, 1991 
 
by Robert Bickers 
 2
 
CHINA SOCIETY OCCASIONAL PAPERS 
No.26 
1992 
 
 
Published June 1992 
© Robert Bickers 
 3
What was the Shanghai Mind? 
 I am sure that you have all heard the legend of the Shanghai 
park sign that read “No dogs and Chinese”.  Perhaps you have 
seen photographs of fake signs with exactly this wording, until 
recently a notice just inside the park entrance retold the story.  
I’m sure you all know that the legend is untrue: no such sign ever 
existed with that wording.  It is, however, doubly symptomatic of 
a problem.  Firstly the Chinese were barred from entering the 
Settlement’s parks before 1928.  Secondly the aggression and 
contempt explicit in the legend’s wording were seen by many in 
China and abroad to be the public attitude of Britons in Shanghai 
towards the Chinese.  In 1928 the North China Herald lamented 
that it had “probably caused more adverse opinion against 
Shanghai than any other incident.”1  “Rather rough I call it,” said 
a Briton in one of Lenox Simpson’s novels, “If I were one of 
them I should kill some foreign devil just to equalize matters.”2 
 At the annual meeting of the foreign ratepayers of the 
Shanghai Municipal Council [SMC] in April 1928 a resolution 
was introduced to remove the ban.3  A speaker in favour of the 
motion outlined its necessity: 
 
The world has been told that all we foreigners of 
Shanghai are Die-hards of the most virulent and 
bloodthirsty type; that we are all suffering from a 
chronic species of Brain fever known as the 
“Shanghai Mind” and that we spend our time 
deliberately insulting our Chinese friends and our 
                                                          
1 North China Herald [NCH], 14/4/28, p. 53.  A transcription of the modern sign 
can be found in Paul Theroux, Riding the Iron Rooster: By Train Through China 
(Harmondsworth, 1989), p. 126. 
2 Putnam Weale, The Eternal Priestess (London, 1914), p. 26. 
3 The SMC was the council of the Shanghai International Settlement, the 
historical result of the amalgamation of the British and American Concessions in 
Shanghai in 1863.  Originally situated to the north of the Chinese city of Shanghai it 
came to include the city’s most famous landmark, the Bund.  The SMC was run rather 
like a town council in Britain, with elected councillors, although it was dominated by 
the big British trading firms.  The French Concession was ruled by a separate 
Concession Municipale Francaise. 
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money on the up-keep of huge orchestras to 
which no one ever listens.4 
In 1930 Lionel Curtis, a professional busy-body from the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, was more 
specific: the “Foreign community here is... the victim of a legend 
created by a journalist.”5 
 That journalist was Arthur Ransome, sent briefly to China 
by the Manchester Guardian..  He’s better known for works other 
than The Chinese Puzzle in which he coined the term “The 
Shanghai Mind” for the British citizens of “the Ulster of the 
East”.  He described their thinking as anachronistic, thoughtlessly 
imperialistic and bellicose.6 Ransome’s was not the only hostile 
public voice.  “It is high time that the six thousand odd British in 
Shanghai faced the situation like the British gentlemen they claim 
to be” announced Bertrand Russell and Dora Black, for instance, 
but Ransome did most damage.7  His work was well-timed: the 
Nationalist Revolution was at its peak in 1927, the Shanghai 
Settlements were on the defensive and the 20,000 British troops 
of the Shanghai Defence Force were the focus of world-wide 
media and public attention.  The troops were also, it was claimed, 
alerting the public in Britain to the “obstinacy of 
Shanghailanders” in letters home.8 
4 The speaker was G.E. Marden, Municipal Gazette, 19/4/28, p. 159c. 
5 Shanghai to Legation No29 (after this just, for example, Shanghai No29), 
13/2/30, enclosing NCDN, 13/2/30, FO228\4283\5 69. 
6 A. Ransome, The Chinese Puzzle (London, 1927), pp. 28-32.  He was not 
popular in Shanghai, see a hostile review of his “prejudiced and superficial” book in 
NCH, 24/3/28, p. 506. 
7 In a letter to The Nation and Athenaeum, 5/2/27, p. 619. 
8 Lampson to Barton 29/1/28, FO228\3779\15 15e.  My own reading of the papers 
of a score of military men does not bear this statement out.  Most did not think to 
question British policy whilst those that did considered it far too lenient and appeared to 
want a full scale war.  Some with doubts about the situation in China found that the turn 
of events combined with life in the treaty port atmosphere caused them to change their 
minds.  see, for example, W. Agnew papers, Letter to Mother, 3/4/27, Imperial War 
Museum.  Other nations sent extra troops to Shanghai but it was largely a British show, 
Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the 
Chinese Revolution of the 1920s (Hanover, New England, 1991), pp. 186-96, 227-31. 
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 Most of the British in China led ordinary, conservative 
lives.  Lives that could have been led by the British anywhere 
abroad; in much better style than in Britain but rarely 
ostentatiously out of the ordinary.  They were too busy or too 
uninterested to get involved in treaty port politics and of those 
who did the genuine extremists among them were few.9  Indeed 
when not being reviled for being die-hards the Shanghai British 
were usually being reviled by literary visitors for being suburban, 
boorish and vulgar. 
 The problem with their society was that it relied too much 
on what now looks too much like racial discrimination for 
comfort.  Chinese critics described the employment, educational, 
parks and health policies of the Shanghai Municipal Council [the 
SMC] as being so biased.10  “No decent Occidental”, wrote the 
North China Daily News, “has throughout all this turmoil, ever 
been anti-Chinese”; but such blandness was incapable of refuting 
the facts of individual behaviour and institutional and social 
segregation.11 
 “Examples” of the Shanghai “Mind” can be found in many 
places - notably in Municipal politics.  There was the inadequate 
response to the 1925 shootings in Shanghai of Chinese 
demonstrators by Settlement police.12   A foreign ratepayers’ vote 
9 The “treaty ports” were those Chinese cities opened to foreign trade, initially as 
a result of the treaties settling the Opium and Arrow Wars in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Within most of these cities the British, and latterly the other foreign powers, 
were given “concession” areas in which they proceeded to exercise sovereign rights and 
in which they developed governing institutions of varying kinds.  This was linked to the 
Chinese granting of extraterritoriality to recognised treaty powers, whereby foreign 
consuls, and not the Chinese courts, had legal jurisdiction over their foreign nationals. 
10 See, for example, The China Critic, 20/3/30, pp. 268-9. 
11 In the 1929 Economy Committee report it was admitted that the “employment of 
Chinese in the Council’s service is at present inadequate”, Municipal Gazette, 9/2/29. 
12 The Shanghai Municipal Police, or SMP, was controlled by the SMC.  It was 
organised and run on British lines but included personnel of Chinese, Russian, Sikh and 
other nationalities.  It only had jurisdiction within the International Settlement, separate 
police forces patrolled the French Concession and Chinese areas. 
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in 1926 announced the desirability of Chinese participation in 
the government of the Settlement but then fudged the issue of 
implementation.13  In April 1927 a resolution to open the parks 
was postponed and much more attention was given to Council 
plans to scrap the Municipal Orchestra.14  The chairman of the 
Shanghai Club claimed that opening the parks would leave “all 
these spaces purposefully and deliberately crowded with the scum 
of this city and there would be no room for us or our real Chinese 
friends”.  Another speaker objected to the idea of raising the ban 
as being “a resolution of surrender and fear” and he demanded 
“no compromise.”15  
 There were such books as Rodney Gilbert’s popular and 
strongly offensive What’s Wrong With China16 (no question 
mark, by the way), Shanghai lawyer Auxion De Ruffé’s Is China 
Mad?,17 and the journalism of O.M. Green in the North China 
Daily News and H.G.W. Woodhead in the Peking and Tientsin 
Times which all gave plenty of evidence of die-hardism.  
Nationalism was frequently described as “a new form of 
Boxerism” and the North China Daily News was among the many 
advocates of foreign military intervention in 1927.18  In itself that 
was not an unnatural political position for them to take.  It was, 
however, frequently quite offensive in tone and embarrassing in 
view of Britain’s stated policy towards China.  The Conservative 
13 F.L.H. Pott, A Short History of Shanghai (Shanghai, 1928), p. 293.  The history 
of Chinese representation, or lack of it, can best be found in pp. 113-30, The Report of 
the Hon. Richard Feetham, C.M.G., to the Shanghai Municipal Council Vol.1 
(Shanghai, 1931). 
14 NCH, 16/4/27, p. 120. 
15 Municipal Gazette, 14/4/27, p. 147. 
16 Published in London and New York, 1926.  There were reprints in London and 
New York in 1927, and again in New York in 1932. 
17 Published in Shanghai in 1928 and very favourably reviewed in the NCH, 
28/4/28, p. 170. 
18 North China Daily News and Herald, China In Chaos (Shanghai, 1927), p. 1; 
The Foreigner in China (Shanghai, 1927), pp. 40-41. 
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government’s Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in 
his “December Memorandum” of late 1926, renounced any 
conception of foreign tutelage in China and argued for “the 
essential justice of the Chinese claim for treaty revision.”19  
 
Why did it matter? 
 It is easy to exaggerate both the extent and the effects of this 
noisy conservatism; Chinese polemicists, of course, made a habit 
of it.  There was much to criticise, so much that one historian has 
described “the ramifications of the imperialist mind” as “the 
barbed wire thread which bound together the whole fabric of 
foreign imperialism in China and made it so unbearable to... 
Chinese nationalism.”20 
 1928 marked a new stage in the history of the British 
presence in China.  An increasingly strong nationalist government 
was in the making after the collapse of the Wuhan regime at the 
end of 1927.21  It controlled those parts of the country that most 
interested the British.  Equally importantly, as the British 
Minister, Sir Miles Lampson (later Baron Killearn), wrote: “the 
deliberate drive against the foreigner, and especially against the 
British, seems to... almost have ceased entirely.”22  
 The suspicion had been growing in diplomatic circles 
throughout 1927 that the British community in Shanghai was 
happily doing very little under the shadow of the Defence Force 
to deal with its outstanding political problems, notably relations 
with the Chinese community in general.   
19 The full text can most easily be found in Sir Frederick Whyte, China and 
Foreign Powers: An Historical Review of their Relations (London, 1928), pp. 51-58. 
20 A. Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth 
Century (Ann Arbor, 1976), pp. 100-101. 
21 C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China 1923-1928 (Cambridge, 
1983), pp. 155-63, 170-76. 
22 Lampson Diaries, 31/12/27. 
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 There is a more familiar diplomatic history of the next 4 
years - concerned with formal treaty revision, but there were also 
attempts by diplomats and others to reform the public behaviour 
of the British in China whilst there was also a considerable 
amount of work done by the unconverted explaining and 
justifying that very behaviour.  It was a long drawn out struggle 
over public images, one that still reverberates.  Most books 
written about the Shanghai settlement have fallen down heavily 
on one side or the other.23 
 
Changing the Shanghai Mind 
 A variety of forces were brought to bear on the Shanghai 
community.  Lampson used personal contacts with businessmen 
to impress on them the need for change, such as Warren Swire, 
who was usually the Minister’s houseguest when he went to 
Beijing.  The Legation, at the Foreign Office’s behest, strove to 
work through the Shanghai Consul-General in attempts to restrain 
the treaty port press and urge reform on the British dominated 
Shanghai Municipal Council.24  There were some private attempts 
23 The following works deal with Sino-British relations in this period or else, 
directly or indirectly, with the theme of this lecture: Nicholas R. Clifford, “A 
Revolution is Not A Tea Party: The “Shanghai Mind(s)” Reconsidered,” Pacific 
Historical Review, LIX (November 1990), pp. 501-26; Clifford, Spoilt Children of 
Empire; Edmund S.K. Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain’s South China 
Policy, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong, 1991); James L. Huskey, “The Cosmopolitan 
Connection: Americans and Chinese in Shanghai during the Interwar Years,” 
Diplomatic History, XI (1987), pp. 227-50. 
24 The Council was first organised in 1854.  A Committee of Roads and Jetties had 
been formed in 1845, two years after the Settlement was established, but it took the 
chaos of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1865) to prompt the foreign consuls to set up the 
Council.  It was intended that it would oversee road building, sanitation, policing 
activities and other quotidian functions required by the Settlement.  By 1928 the 
Council consisted of five British members, two Americans and two Japanese, elected on 
a limited franchise by a proportion of the foreign rate[ayers.  This was the result of 
informal arrangements which had emerged over the years rather than a fixed quota 
system.  The Councillors were elected annually, but elections were frequently 
unnecessary as the city oligarchs parcelled out the seats among themselves.  A good 
history of the SMC and its role in the development of modern Shanghai has yet to be 
written. 
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to influence people, such as the informal Sino-British 
discussion groups with British officers, businessmen and other 
non-missionaries, organised by the Methodist missionary Ronald 
Rees, but these were on too small a scale.  It was Shanghai’s 
public face which needed altering.25 
 “Public opinion at home will judge by concrete acts or the 
absence of them.  It is for Shanghai to provide the concrete acts”, 
wrote Lampson to Consul-General Barton in the latter part of 
1927.  “Time is short”, he concluded.26  Barton was rightly felt to 
be too sympathetic to the Shanghai cause.27  Lampson had to cope 
with this recalcitrance and the more go-ahead attitude back in 
London.  He was still quite ready on occasion to defend the 
British in the treaty ports: 
 
What they are being asked to do is to prepare to 
sacrifice what they have built up, and hand it over 
sooner or later to what there is every reason to 
suppose will be a corrupt and incompetent 
administration.28 
he wrote to the Far East Department Head towards the end of 
1927, but the response was unsympathetic, what they were: 
being: 
 
asked to do is surely rather to adapt themselves at 
long last to the new conditions which they have 
for so long refused to recognise and to secure 
their present position and future prospects by 
embarking on a frank policy of sincere co-
25 Rees, Circular Letter, 30/3/32, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society 
Archives, South China, fiche 582.  Although Shanghai was the China headquarters of 
most of the British mission societies its missionary population is not the subject of this 
lecture.  It was far smaller than the British commercial population and was not 
representative of the “Shanghai British” although in 1927, as a result of their evacuation 
from the Chinese interior the city was overflowing with missionaries.  Many of them 
were shocked by the attitudes and behaviour of the “Shanghailanders” (as they called 
themselves) but many shared their conservative political views about the Guomindang 
and the treaty port status quo. 
26 Lampson to Barton, 1/11/27, FO228\3677\15 69.  See the rest of this dossier for 
the evidence of Barton’s intransigence on the matter. 
27 So much so that he was later kicked upstairs to be Minister to Abyssinia. 
28 Lampson to Mounsey, S/O, 4/11/27, FO228\3677\15 69. 
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operation with the Chinese on a basis of 
equality.29 
Other officials on the spot were also very critical, such as the first 
commander of the Shanghai Defence Force, General Duncan.30  
The pressure of opinion led Lampson to feel that “an almost anti-
Shanghai drive may develop.”31  British officialdom had to be 
delicate.  The December Memorandum and the Chen-O’Malley 
agreements handing the Hankou and Jiujiang concessions back to 
Chinese administration, were not popular and relations between 
the business communities and the diplomats were difficult.   
 
Encouraging Reform 
Parks and Councillors 
 The first real measure of reform took place in early 1928 
when three Chinese councillors were finally allowed on to the 
council.  This was the measure approved in 1926 but then 
suspended and Barton had been loathe to initiate the Consular 
meetings which had to be held in order to confirm this 
constitutional change.32  The measure was accompanied by 
provisos that the number would be increased at some point; 
possibly within a year promised Lampson.33 
 The parks issue was the next major test.  Despite a 
campaign against the proposal in the letter columns of the North 
China Daily News the ban was lifted and the parks opened to 
ticket-buying Chinese in 1928.  Some later memoir-writers were 
still bitter about this decision; contemporary news reports were 
happier about the results, although the commercial fishing 
29 Mounsey to Lampson, S/O 18/1/28, FO228\3883\8 69. 
30 Gen.  J. Duncan to Lampson, S/O 16/1/28, FO228\3804\16 25a. 
31 Lampson to Barton, to Shanghai, No46.  29/1/28, FO228\3779\15 15e. 
32 See the correspondence in FO228\3779 dossier 69. 
33 He was speaking to Yu Xiaqing [Yu Yah-ching], Lampson Diaries, 13/3/28. 
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activities of the more enterprising Chinese visitors caused quite 
a rumpus until a fishing licence system was organised.34 
 In 1929 there was pressure for a further increase in the 
number of Chinese councillors.  It was stoutly resisted by the 
foreign councillors who praised their Chinese colleagues in public 
but complained about them in private.  The Chairman was also 
fearful that an increased number of Chinese councillors would 
“some fine day” join votes with the Japanese and “swamp the 
white vote on the Council.”35  “They have some difficulty in 
realising... that... “there is a world elsewhere”, besides Shanghai 
or even China” complained the Acting Consul-General.36  The 
Foreign Office was driven to complain that the tone of the rebuff 
was “injudicious” and that foreign opinion might well provoke 
the Chinese.37 
 In January 1930 the non-Chinese councillors bowed to this 
foreign and Chinese pressure, and announced the intention of the 
Council to propose an increase.  A packed ratepayers meeting 
however, was roused by a British lawyer, Ranald G. Macdonald 
into overthrowing the motion.  He spurned the critics of “die-
hards” who believed that “foreigners out here still painted 
themselves with woad”, claimed that the problem lay in the 
absence of a sincere Chinese desire for co-operation, exhorted the 
meeting not to “wantonly” sell “our birthright” and finished with 
a sizeable quotation from the Qianlong Emperor’s famously 
dismissive address to George III as proof of Chinese arrogance.38  
34 Arch Carey, The War Years at Shanghai 1941-45-49 (New York, 1968), p. 158; 
NCH, 9/6/28, p. 43, 11/8/28, p. 233; China Journal, September 1928, p. 156, October 
1928, p. 259. 
35 Minister in Shanghai to Legation, No13, “Minute of a meeting with Mr 
Arnhold”, 24/5/29, FO228\4045\8 69. 
36 Garstin to Lampson, S/O 16/6/29, FO228\4045\9 69. 
37 FO to Lampson, 16/5/29, FO228\4045\15 69. 
38 Shanghai No103, 22/4/30, FO228\4283\27 69B. 
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“Shanghai Mind Reveals Itself” announced the China Critic.39  
The Consul-General panicked and suggested the forcing through 
of the change by the Consular Body in Shanghai and the 
Diplomatic Body in Beijing.40  An emergency meeting was called 
instead and intense lobbying engaged in to warn the British 
community of the seriousness of the matter.41  An exceptionally 
large meeting of ratepayers was drummed and bussed up (in 
special transport to beat a bus and tram strike), Japanese voters 
packed the meeting, and the resolution was passed by a bored 
majority before Macdonald was allowed to finish a repeat 
speech.42 
 This little crisis shows just what the diplomats were up 
against, a majority of the British population in Shanghai who 
were worried about their futures and were opposed to any 
measures which would weaken their positions.  These were the 
“small Treaty Port people”, as Warren Swire characteristically 
termed them.43  This included those owning land and property, or 
working for, or running, businesses or services based in the 
settlement that were not part of the expatriate British community 
of London based firms.  Their investment in Shanghai was more 
personal and immediate than that of ICI, Jardines, British 
American Tobacco [BAT] or the Asiatic Petroleum Company 
[APC].  They felt that they were being betrayed and their hostility 
embraced the Council itself; sometimes directly.  Supporters of a 
motion to allow the press into Council meetings attacked the 
39 China Critic, 24/4/30, pp. 394-5. 
40 Shanghai No71, 17/4/30, FO228\4283\18 69B. 
41 Brenan to Lampson, Private, 22/4/30, FO228\4370 30B; Shanghai No103, 
22/4/30, FO228\4283\27 69B. 
42 Shanghai No113, 5/5/30, FO228\4283\37 69B. 
43 G.W. Swire to John S. Scott, 27/1/33, JSSI 3/8. 
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Council’s “veil of mystery and secrecy” for precisely these 
reasons.44  
 This distrust was a problem.  The French Concession was 
run absolutely by the French Consul-General (although between 
1928 and 1932 effective control was devolved into the hands of 
the Shanghai underworld organisation, the Green Gang [Qing 
bang]45) but the British were proud of the great example of 
Municipal self-government they felt the Settlement to be.46  The 
consequence of even this limited democracy was a lack of 
outright control over affairs in Shanghai.  Indirect control and 
interference was feared and resented, “Beware of any vaguely 
worded promises - Beware even of statement made by senior 
members of the Council’s staff” warned the seconder of the press 
motion in 1930.47  
 
Consular Plottings 
 There was certainly cause to beware of the British Legation 
and Consul-General’s long-standing attempts to influence the 
44 Municipal Gazette, 17/4/30, p. 151, E.F. Harris was the speaker. 
45 Brian G. Martin, ““The Pact with the Devil”: The Relationship between the 
Green Gang and the French Concession Authorities, 1925-1935”, Papers on Far 
Eastern History, 39 (1989), pp. 94-125. 
46 The Council, though, was oligarchic and consistently dominated by the big 
firms.  In 1930, for instance, we find Neilage Brown, Swires Shanghai Manager, 
announcing to Lampson that: “It was only fair that if [later on] the Council should co-
opt another member, it should be he that should have it.” This sort of attitude caused a 
great deal of complacency among both ratepayers and Councillors.  In 1935 only 3,900 
out of a foreign population of 28,000 had a vote.  Few of these bothered to vote in the 
elections which only ever occurred when Consular and other plotting failed to stop 
excess candidates standing.  For example there was no election in 1927.  At the 
notorious 1930 ratepayers meeting Ranald Macdonald’s rabble rousing left the 
councillors speechless, it: “came as a complete surprise to the Council, who were 
confident that there would be no serious opposition to the resolution and had made no 
preparation for such  a Contingency.”They were so taken aback that none of them 
thought to speak against Macdonald.  “SMC Election: Minister’s Meeting with Mr 
Brown”, Minister’s Tour Series No49, 6/2/30, FO228\4283\7 69B; F.C. Jones, 
Shanghai and Tientsin with special reference to foreign interests (London, 1940), p. 7; 
Shanghai No103, 22/4/30, FO228\4283\27 69b. 
47 Municipal Gazette, p. 153, G.E. Marden. 
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composition of the Council.  Garstin in 1929 attempted to 
persuade some candidates not to stand so as not to split the vote 
and prevent the informal quota of five British candidates being 
elected; he also wanted the present five councillors to stay.  The 
candidates were twice called to his office and asked to agree 
among themselves who should withdraw, without success.48  
Although loathe to repeat the exercise the following year because 
of criticisms of this “plotting,” Garstin had to; even Lampson 
joined in to dissuade Swire’s Manager from standing.49  Luckily 
for all concerned, except Chairman Arnhold who polled last, 
probably because of a newspaper-inspired revolt against the 
recent District Court Agreement with the Chinese (which saw the 
rendition to Chinese control of the courts dealing with Chinese 
and sino-foreign cases).50 The new Consul-General Brenan could 
announce that he was pleased with the new Council as “Four out 
of the six British members are old personal friends of mine and I 
think that all six will work well together and with me.”51  
Arnhold’s, as it turned out, temporary departure, was welcomed, 
as he was felt by the Legation to be a too much of a die-hard. 
 There were other reasons for avoiding elections that year.  It 
was feared that “one of the electoral cries was going to be over 
this question of closing the local cabarets at 2a.m., the present 
hour being 4 a.m..  It would be hard to conceive an issue which 
48 Shanghai No51, 23/2/29, FO228\4046\7 69B; Shanghai No53, 25/2/29, 
FO228\40446\8 69B. 
49 Shanghai No10, 3/2/30, FO228\4283\6 69B; Shanghai No4 2/1/30, 
FO228\4283\1 69B; Minister’s Tour Series No49, 6/2/30, FO228\4283\7 69B; SMC 
Chairman H.E. Arnhold suggested Lampson should appeal to the 3 extra candidates to 
withdraw “on patriotic grounds”.  Minister’s Tour Series No34 25/1/30, FO228\4283\8 
69B. 
50 Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, pp. 231-32.  The history of the Shanghai 
Mixed and Provisional Courts is the subject of a forthcoming monograph by Tahirih 
Lee. 
51 Brenan to Lampson, S/O, 13/3/30, FO228\4283\15 69B. 
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would make Shanghai look worse in the eyes of the world”, 
correctly concluded the report.52 
 
The Press 
 Consistent attempts to influence and change public opinion, 
or at least the expression of it, can also be shown by the relations 
between British officialdom and the newspapers.  Chinese 
political opinion viewed the North China Daily News as an 
official British mouthpiece.53  This was unfortunate as its 
reputation for die-hardness was thoroughly deserved.  It was also 
hostile towards British policy.  The editor, O.M. Green, was 
frequently called upon to mend his ways on both counts.  In 1929 
it was banned from the Chinese mails for a period for criticism of 
the Guomindang and Green was advised to tone things down by 
the Consul-General.  “His case is pretty hopeless - He doesn’t 
take in the obvious”, wrote Lampson;54  privately he felt “the man 
is an ass.”55  Green continued writing and working unofficially 
and officially for the interests of the Shanghai British long after 
1930, when he retired, or was retired.  Lampson used all his 
influence to “get a different and better type to take his place” to 
the point of seeing the proprietor to impress on him the “need for 
a change of policy by the paper”.  He had already received a 
deputation containing Lionel Curtis and Swire’s N.S. Brown 
suggesting a better man.56  In this he seems to have succeeded, at 
least temporarily.57  Three years earlier Austen Chamberlain had 
persuaded Geoffrey Dawson, editor of the The Times to seek 
52 Minister’s Tour Series No34, 25/1/30, FO228\4283\8 69. 
53 Wellington Koo, Memoirs, Vol 2, p. 46; China Critic, 23/1/30, p. 75. 
54 See dossier 22z 1929, FO228\3987; Lampson Minute on Shanghai No133, 
22/4/29, FO228\3987\5 22z. 
55 Lampson Diaries, 19/1/30. 
56 Lampson to Selby, to FO No40, 19/1/30, FO228\4370 22L; Lampson Diaries, 
18/1/30. 
57 Thomas Ming-Heng Chao, The Foreign Press in China (Shanghai, 1931), p. 50. 
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Lampson’s help in getting a correspondent for the paper to 
replace the biased Green.58  Whilst in January 1930 Lampson 
dined with Fraser of the The Times and “gave him a little lecture 
about the advantages of taking a somewhat more sympathetic 
attitude” in his messages home to the paper.59 
 They were tougher on W. Bruce Lockhart, editor of a bi-
weekly paper called The Showdown, which was a self-described 
admirer of yellow press journalism, printed on yellow paper.  It 
was said to “exploit the craving for scurrilous abuse of the 
Chinese, which exists on the part of a section of the Foreign 
Community in Shanghai” and had a circulation of 1,500.  It was a 
one-man show, obnoxiously racist, even by the standards of its 
time, and concerned with furthering Lockhart’s business interests.  
On Lampson’s orders Lockhart was hauled up in front of the 
Consul-General after complaints from the Nationalist Minister for 
Foreign Affairs.  After a further offence he was found guilty of 
contempt of court relating to some comments, under the heading 
“The Savagery of the Rice-Fed Mind”, about a Chinese judge.60 
 The Legation also did its best to keep particularly delicate 
stories out of the press, especially the Chinese papers.  Incidents 
involving British soldiers and the deaths of Chinese were 
particularly troublesome.61  The North China Daily News itself 
exercised a good deal of self-censorship to protect the image of 
the British community. 
 
Public Relations and Propaganda 
 The Shanghai Municipal Council was quite aware of its 
image problem; and as well as initiating some measures of reform 
58 Chamberlain to Lampson, 11/4/27, FO800\260. 
59 Lampson Diaries, 20/1/30. 
60 Shanghai No202, 25/7/30 “List of Foreign Newspapers in Shanghai”, 
FO228\4189\3 22; Shanghai No256, 6/12/29, FO228\4040\3 61L. 
61 For example see Lampson Diaries, 20/10/30. 
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it paid close, if slow, attention to publicising its case and 
activities.  The Legation had ambivalent feelings about these 
public-relations campaigns.  In June 1927 a Shanghai Publicity 
Bureau was set up to disseminate pro-SMC and anti-Communist 
propaganda.  It built on the work of the Constitutional Defence 
League, a “non-political” and international group set up to 
publish anti-Communist propaganda in Chinese to counter the 
efforts of the Comintern.  This was founded in late 1925 and had 
taken its message to factories and mills in Shanghai and to 
audiences in Manchester, London and Bradford but was 
“moribund” by 1928.62   In a page long letter to the North China 
Daily News in 1927 on “The Need of Making Facts Known”, 
Rodney Gilbert suggested changing the function of the League to 
the dissemination of propaganda about Shanghai abroad, to 
counter misconceptions and the erroneous views held abroad 
about the Shanghailanders.63  The Bureau was originally a quasi-
Municipal body, with offices in the SMC administration building 
and an SMC representative on its committee.64 
 It published and circulated a News Bulletin which attempted 
to lay out the facts about the Settlement, extraterritoriality and the 
consequences of treaty revision as Shanghai saw them.  The aim 
was to explain the position taken up by the British community 
and to alter the meaning of the die-hard label for the better.  
Lampson initially recommended “Close, but unofficial liaison” to 
62 The Constitution and an Introductory newsletter can be found in Butterfield and 
Swire, Shanghai to John Swire and Sons (London, No38, 24/4/26, JSSII 2/5; more 
information can be found in Butterfield and Swire, Shanghai to John Swire and Sons, 
London, No36 18/3/27, JSSII 2/6, and NCH, 6/2/26, p. 235, 20/3/26, p. 521; on its 
demise see, for example,  NCH, 4/8/28, p. 200. 
63 NCH, 16/4/27, p. 114. 
64 Its objects were: “to explain the functions of municipal government, and to 
foster a Sino-Foreign public-opinion in favour of the gradual development of the 
Shanghai administration... to counteract subversive propaganda, and [will] endeavour to 
create an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation between Chinese and foreigners” 
NCH, 11/6/27, p. 473.   
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the Consul-General.65  But Swires refused to distribute the 
News Bulletin because of its “critical, if not unfriendly tone 
towards matters Chinese.”66  By early 1929 this was also the 
feeling of the Chinese, who made requests to the SMC to 
suppress it.67  The calibre of those involved was not rated too 
highly.  Huntley Davidson, the Director, had taken its case to 
Britain and the States in 1929, representing the British and 
American Councillors and the Chairman of the British Chamber 
of Commerce in a “personal capacity” that was funded by British 
firms.  He presented a Memorandum calling for the establishment 
of a free-port, under League of Nations mandate, at Shanghai.  
This was not well received.  Huntley Davidson, reported one 
Swire director, appeared “to be doing the Shanghai Community 
incalculable harm”.  At the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
the impression he left behind was that “if that is really the frame 
of mind and outlook of the Shanghai Community, Heaven help 
them.”68 
 The Bureau’s publications in English were a little too dense 
to have any mass appeal.  A similar group was more successful in 
Tianjin.  There the Tientsin British Committee of Information 
published a series of Memoranda from 1926 throughout the 
1930s.  These were mainly articles reprinted from newspapers 
concerning matters communist before 1928 and extraterritoriality 
afterwards.  They did take time out in 1927 to deal themselves 
65 Garstin to Aveling, 5/10/28, Lampson minute on same, FO228\3883\3 69k. 
66 Butterfield and Swire, Shanghai to John Swire and Sons, London, 31/8/28, JSSII 
2/7. 
67 Garstin to Aveling S/O 28/1/29, FO228\4046\2 69k; Hewlett to Lampson 
26/3/29, FO228\4046\4 69k; Lampson Minute, 8/7/29, FO228\4046\10 69k. 
68 FO No524 15/5/29, FO228\4045\11 69; FO to Shanghai No17, 16/5/29, 
FO228\4045\15 69; [?] to G.W. Swire, 10/5/29, Swire Add.15, Directors Now Out East.  
It was also felt that he was rather too interested in land interests as they affected the 
Land Investment Co.  he worked for, and in whose offices the SPB had been given 
space after 1927, Hewlett to Lampson, 26/3/29, FO228\4046\4 69k, Teichman minute, 
15/11/29, on FO228\4046\12 69k. 
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with “A Mischievous Slander”, when “An Old Lie”, about the 
Shanghai parks, reappeared.69  
 
Lie Correcting 
 To correct “old lies” the SMC tried other methods.  Rodney 
Gilbert had suggested that all foreign residents should write 
letters outlining the “real situation” to their friends, or public 
representatives at home.  The Tientsin memoranda were designed 
for this, as were the many reprints of newspaper articles one 
comes across in the archives.  In 1928 an ad-hoc committee of ex-
SMC councillors living in Britain was appointed “to keep a 
lookout for reports about China and to follow up every mis-
statement with a prompt correction”.  Their first act was the 
correction of a Morning Post story about the parks ban.  In June 
1928 they vented their spleen against a New Statesman article.70  
The North China Daily News also made a habit of reprinting 
particularly absurd stories culled from the home press such as one 
from The Daily Express in 1928, for example, entitled “Notorious 
City of the Far East”.  This was written by a correspondent with 
“hazy ideas of Sax Rohmer’s Chinese underworld and opium den 
life flitting through” his mind.71 
 Rodney Gilbert chose another medium for passing on the 
message.  In 1929 he wrote a novel, The Indiscretions of Lin 
Mang, in which a bandit turned mandarin describes his life.  The 
story was an excuse for Gilbert to plug his usual message about 
the venality and cruelty of Chinese political life.  At the end of 
the novel we find the ex-bandit has been made chief negotiator on 
the Chinese side in the forthcoming extraterritoriality 
69 Tientsin British Committee of Information, Memorandum No19, March 1927. 
70 NCH, 25/2/28, p. 294; NCH, 9/6/28, p. 396. 
71 NCH, 14/7/28, p. 82.  The weariness of the headlines speaks volumes, “As 
others see us: Typical Misdescription of Shanghai”. 
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negotiations.72  Lenox Simpson’s novels, especially the trilogy 
which finished with China’s Crucifixion in 1929 left a similar 
impression.73  The thrillers of James Bennett were furiously anti-
nationalist and pro-treaty port whilst the romances of Louise 
Jordan Miln came to the same conclusion, despite her sinophilia 
and her critiques of “Occidental bad manners.”74 
 The SMC itself did not create an official publicity post until 
late 1931 in response to ratepayers’ pressure, at least 6 years after 
it truly began to need one.  The initial idea behind the move was 
the usual one of informing and influencing foreign opinion;75  but 
the Council came to feel that the overriding need was for better 
publicity in China because the existing inadequate system led to 
“misunderstandings” on the part of the Chinese.76  After all it was 
only from 1930 that the Municipal Gazette, annual reports and 
other Council material had been published in Chinese 
translation.77  The press post was abolished as an economy 
measure at the end of 1936 but had dutifully released 
communiques and greeted visiting foreign journalists with “a 
short history of the Settlement, a statement of its financial 
position, and an outline of Council activities”.  It also produced 
sections on the city for guide books.78  
 
The Feetham Report 
  The climax of these moves by the SMC to be seen to be 
acting could be said be the Report commissioned from Judge 
72 Rodney Gilbert, The Indiscretions of Lin Mang (London, 1929). 
73 Putnam Weale (the pseudonym of Bertram Lenox Simpson) Wang the Ninth, the 
Story of a Chinese Boy (London, 1920), Her Closed Hands (London, 1927), China’s 
Crucifixion (London, 1929). 
74 See, for example, The Vintage of Yön Yee (London, 1931), p. 67. 
75 Municipal Gazette, 17/4/30, pp. 151-56. 
76 Ibid., 10/7/31, p. 313, “Council Minutes”. 
77 Ibid., 23/8/30, p. 355. 
78 NCH, 28/7/31, pp. 109, 122; Shanghai Municipal Council Report for the Year 
1936 and Budget for the Year 1937 (Shanghai, 1937), p. 27; SMC Report 1935, p. 262. 
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Richard Feetham in 1931.  Feetham was instructed to advise 
the Council “with a view to assisting them in formulating some 
constructive plan or scheme” which would satisfy Chinese 
aspirations and protect business interests.79  Feetham’s report has 
been rightly described as “still born” and “a monumental 
statement of the case against any material surrender of the 
Shanghai citadel.”80  It was a tremendous and mighty irrelevance 
but it was good publicity.  It looked like a concrete act and it 
could be held up to foreign opinion as proof of a desire to 
compromise on the part of the city’s rulers.  In fact the spirit of 
the investigation and report clashed with the spirit of the 
extraterritoriality negotiations then underway between Lampson 
and Wang Zhengting.  Feetham’s sponsors and supporters felt 
that Shanghai should be excluded from these negotiations.81  In 
later years some businessmen privately felt that Lampson’s 
negotiations were a betrayal of the good will that motivated the 
SMC’s launching of the Feetham investigation.82  As has been 
shown this narrowness of outlook was no small problem. 
 
The “small people” get organised 
 Outside of the municipal structures the China Association 
and the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce were the 
accepted media through which commercial Shanghai made its 
feelings felt in letters to the press, ministers and Foreign Office, 
and in meetings with officials and politicians.  But there were 
other attempts, explicitly avoiding these established channels, to 
79 Report of the Hon.  Mr Justice Feetham, C.M.G.  to the Shanghai Municipal 
Council, Vol.1, p. 5. 
80 Sir Erich Teichman, Affairs of China (London, 1938), p. 162. 
81 See, for example, Brenan to Lampson, 12/2/30, FO228\4370 84. 
82 See, for example, J.R. Jones to A.S. Henchman, 12/2/52 and Henchman to 
Jones, 29/4/52, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Archives, S16.1 “Personalities and 
Narratives”. 
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mobilise public opinion in Shanghai and to represent it within 
the city, at the Legations and at home. 
 British treaty port hostility to official policies achieved 
organisational form in the Shanghai British Residents Association 
or BRA.  This was founded in late 1931 in response to fears about 
the progress of the extraterritoriality negotiations and the hysteria 
whipped up over the disappearance and death in Chinese military 
custody of a 19 year old Briton, John Thorburn.83  
 This was not a new phenomenon at a time of crisis.  A 
Shanghai Property Owners Association was formed in September 
192784 and in August a “Shanghai Fascisti” (a deliberate 
reference to Mussolini’s “Blackshirts”) had been organised, to 
“support the authorities in the present crisis, and to act in the 
interests of the entire community”.  There was a great rush to 
enrol.85  It is fairly obvious from letters and diaries that 
disillusionment with the Foreign Office, Legation and business 
elites was thorough and the appeal of a paramilitary organisation 
tapped into a rich vein of subdued violent discontent.86  So much 
so that Council leader Fessenden took pains to urge great caution 
on the organisation for fear of incidents.87  It was one of the 
precursors of the BRA, its leadership was mainly British and at 
least one local journalist was actively involved in both.88  
83 NCH, 17/11/31, pp. 230, 240. 
84 NCH, 1/9/27, The membership was international, but as most property in the 
settlement was owned by Britons this was rather a nicety. 
85 NCH, 20/8/27, p. 323. 
86 Shanghai Detective R.M. Tinkler, for example, wildly wrote to his sister that 
“Locally if no action is taken soon, foreign guerillas will start terrorising the Chinese 
troops and force a conclusion”, 28/3/27, Tinkler Papers, IWM. 
87 NCH, 1/10/27, p. 14.  It seems to have fizzled out in 1928 as the situation 
stabilised, but survived into the new year, NCH, 14/1/28, p. 53. 
88 Arthur de C. Sowerby, editor of the China Journal, and self-styled explorer, was 
replacement leader of the Fascisti and Committee member of the BRA, NCH, 14/1/28, 
p. 53, NCH, 28/12/32, p. 498. 
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 The BRA set out to organise and inform.  It had a 
committee in London and paid political and publicity agents 
there.  Our old friend O.M. Green filled the publicity post with 
his customary tact and gravity.89  Its leading lights certainly saw 
themselves as representing the smaller interests.  Woodhead was 
its second chairman, and Ranald G. Macdonald, that notable 
rabble-rouser, was Vice-Chairman from 1932 and Chairman in 
1934.  Its reputation has not been helped by the charges of early 
pro-Japanese sympathies which have come to stick.90 
 
The Fruits of Fraternisation 
 There were changes elsewhere.  Businesses and other 
groups also made changes.  In and after 1927 many Britons in the 
Customs, in Missions and in business who could not, or would 
not, adapt to the changing situation were eased or forced out.  
Companies like Swires began to get quite tough with managers 
who were slow at changing.  Warren Swire and N.S. Brown 
showed the effect individuals could have as well as the problems 
of dealing with a community which was not inclined to be liberal 
in nature and from which change was only grudgingly 
forthcoming.91  In 1929 when Warren Swire was in despair over 
89 NCH, 30/11/32, p. 334. 
90 For many of its members Japan’s actions in China after 1931 were what the 
British should have done in the years after 1925.  This is certainly the stance taken, in 
effect, by Woodhead in his A Visit to Manchukuo (Shanghai, 1932), pp. 106-107; after 
1937 this attitude changed.  See also S.L. Endicott Diplomacy and Enterprise: British 
China Policy 1933-1937 (Manchester, 1975), pp. 28-30 and Ann Trotter, Britain and 
East Asia 1933-1937 (London, 1975), pp. 26-7. 
91 Swires had been conciliatory, by British standards, ever since 1925.  The 
Director in the East had been urged by Warren Swire in 1926 to “preach the gospel of 
concession to Chinese sentiment on every possible occasion” so that British opinion in 
the east “may be already reconciled to a large extent to the absolute necessity of 
concessions to China”.  Later that year he was instructed to make sure that the then 
Shanghai manager T.H.R.Shaw got on to the SMC; which he did.  But Shaw was a die-
hard and far from educating the British he spent much energy on the anti-communist 
educational activities of the Constitutional Defence League, G.W. Swire to C.C. Scott 
21/5/26, 22/10/26, Swire Add.15 DNOE; Butterfield and Swire, Shanghai to John Swire 
and Sons (London, No’s 1, 21, JSSII 2/5. 
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the conservatism of the British community, the conservative 
Shaw was replaced by Brown, who was “purposefully sent to 
Shanghai by his firm in order to get on to the Council and try to 
get a real move on progressively.”92  So progressive was he that 
he was described as “not a persona grata with many influential 
members of the British community” who, as was later written, 
“have regarded his fraternization with the Chinese with some 
suspicion.”93  Even Lampson was cynical about the Swire 
efforts.94  Brown was very involved with Lionel Curtis and his 
activities connected with the Feetham report.  He was also 
instrumental in such things as getting the Shanghai Paper Hunt 
Club to make an effort to enrol more “Chinese gentlemen riders” 
as a quid pro quo for the rescinding of restrictions on hunting in 
the countryside around Shanghai.  He even raised this question at 
a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek.95  The BRA seems to have been 
responsible for Brown losing his council seat in the 1933 SMC 
elections.96  He came bottom of the poll in what looks like a 
delayed judgment on his “fraternization”.  Swires did not support 
the BRA and Brown was not a member.  Other individuals tried 
hard too.  BAT’s Archibald Rose got very excited in 1930 with “a 
campaign about peace in China”, by which he meant 
reconciliation with the Nationalists and the use of “Moral 
Leadership” as the keystone of British policy.  This would 
involve “close and constant Personal relations” with the Chinese.  
Rose was a noisy supporter of Lionel Curtis and was distrusted by 
                                                          
92 G.W. Swire to J.K. Swire, 23/2/29, Swire Add.15; Minister’s Tour Series No 49, 
6/2/30, FO228\4283\7 69b. 
93 Garstin, Shanghai No18, 3/2/30, FO228\4283\6 69b; Brennan to Lampson, S/O 
30/10/30, FO228\4134\40 3. 
94 Lampson Diaries, 17/1/30, 20/1/30. 
95 Enclosure in Brenan to Lampson, S/O, 30/10/30, FO228\4134\40 3. 
96 NCH, 29/3/33, p. 486. 
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the Legation, which felt he was a “hot-air artist”.  But his 
rhetoric was at least more helpful than that of many others.97 
 These things mattered at the time.  Indifference to social 
intercourse or fraternisation with the Chinese and language study, 
segregationist rules about club and Masonic lodge membership, 
the parks, and higher grade employment in municipalities and 
business firms, whilst not special either to the British, nor to the 
British in China, made for bad publicity.  China, after all, was not 
a colony. 
 Now these things also mattered because they were bad for 
business.  Britain’s foreign competitors appeared to have the edge 
on the British when it came to training.  Indeed at one point there 
were more foreign than British students learning Chinese at the 
Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce’s language school.98  
The Germans were an increasing worry.  Their staff were better 
linguists and their sales organisations better adapted to changing 
patterns of trade.  Chief among these was the increasing direct 
trade between British and Chinese firms, cutting out middlemen.  
Companies were also phasing out their compradores and the 
parallel structures necessitated by compradoric trade.  Chinese 
employees were certainly cheaper and they were better suited to 
dealing with the new generation of Chinese businessmen.99 
 During the Great War, and after, a wealthy Chinese 
bourgeois class had come into existence in Shanghai100; much of 
97 Rose to Lampson, 15/5/30, enclosing Memorandum on “China”, FO228\4134\26 
3. 
98 “The Chamber’s Language School”, British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, 
Journal, August 1930, p. 219. 
99 The compradore was the Chinese agent of a foreign company.  He oversaw the 
Chinese business, customers and staff, of the company and, historically, played a vital 
role in the development of foreign trade.  By the 1920s and 1930s, with the acceleration 
of direct trade links the Compradore was becoming an anachronism and his often 
parallel business structure a luxury. 
100 Marie-Claire Bergère, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie 1911-1937, 
(Cambridge, 1989). 
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it was foreign educated and unwilling to acquiesce in the 
accepted relationship with foreigners.  Chinese steamship 
passengers for example wanted better accommodation and were 
prepared to pay for it and were no longer ready to put up with the 
minor and other indignities of what was effectively segregation.  
Even the wealthier Chinese patients in mission hospitals in the 
interior were demanding better standards. 
 It seems that the British elite quickly learnt the value of 
friendly social intercourse with the Chinese elites in the 1930s.  
Indeed, in 1937 the Bank of England’s representative in Shanghai 
felt progress on the issue great enough and important enough to 
include in his report home.101  They had more in common, it was 
rightly felt, as businessmen and social leaders, than any political 
or ethnic differences could overshadow.  This made 
discrimination at the elite level foolish, as well as offensive. 
 Club life was an area in which some moves were made.  A 
successful International Club already existed in Qingdao and ran 
smoothly.102  A new International Club was set up in Nanjing in 
early 1929 and provided a forum in which the Miles Lampson 
and the Consul-General could get extremely drunk with 
Nationalist worthies.103  Lampson admitted that even the 
Legation, before his arrival, “saw very little” of the Chinese and 
set out to right this.104  Later an Anglo-Chinese club was formed 
to lubricate relations over regular dinners.105  Shanghai was 
slower about this, although there was an International Recreation 
101 W. Kirkpatrick, “Notes for remarks to advisory committee Export Credits 
Guarantee Department on 2/11/37”, p. 13 “I was glad to find among the younger heads 
of British firms, a definite new life pro-Chinese social movement and definitely 
improving not only social but also economic and business relations with the Chinese”, 
BOE G1/296 31. 
102 Lampson Diaries, 4/2/28. 
103 Lampson Diaries, 7/12/28, 11/9/29. 
104 Lampson to Chamberlain 23/2/27, FO800\260 ff256. 
105 Lampson Diaries, 13/11/29, 20/12/29. 
 27
                                                          
Club and at one stage even O.M Green was advocating 
admission of Chinese to the Shanghai Club.106  In 1931, in 
recognition of the fact that: 
 
social contact between Chinese and foreigners is, 
except in a small way, nonexistent, and it is, 
indeed, somewhat difficult for foreigners and 
Chinese to meet socially, 
ambitious plans were floated for an International Club which 
would take over the premises of the Majestic Hotel.  Nothing 
seems to have come of what the North China Daily News 
described as “one of the most important innovations in the social 
history of Shanghai.”107  Actually it appears that the owners of the 
site were just desperate to sell having already been turned down 
by the ratepayers to whom they’d offered it as a new civic 
centre.108  There was a Union Club of China but its struggle to 
exist as more than a pleasant idea was shown by its need to move 
premises in 1928 to try and attract more users on their way home 
after work.109 
 
Education and Restraint 
 There was always the next generation.  In 1934 the 
Department of Overseas Trade [DOT] published a pamphlet 
entitled China: Notes on Some Aspects of Life in China for the 
Information of Business Visitors.  The genesis of this booklet is 
interesting.  In June 1932 Louis Beale, Commercial Counsellor at 
Shanghai, wrote to Sir Edward Crowe at the DOT about the then 
missionary E.R. Hughes who “while in England on leave intends 
to spend some time exploring the possibilities of closer intimacy 
between Shanghai British and Chinese”.  He was encouraged in 
106 Lampson Diaries, 9/3/28. 
107 NCH, 21/7/31, p. 86 The speaker was N.L. Sparke.  NCH, 14/7/31, p. 42. 
108 Municipal Gazette, 6/3/31 p. 90, 13/3/31, p. 97, 15/4/31, p. 174, 22/4/31, pp. 
182-186. 
109 NCH, 31/3/28, p. 534; 7/7/28, p. 18. 
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this by the new Swire manager in Shanghai and by G.E. 
Hubbard, then political agent of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank, who had prepared a memo describing “a somewhat 
nebulous project for the inculcating into younger minds of a 
somewhat better conception of, and attitude towards, the Chinese 
and China.”110  Various approaches were suggested including, for 
instance, “popular lectures” possibly “at the China Society.”111 
 Beale favoured a handbook of some sort and thought the 
project vital for British trade.  Hughes’ own aims were a little less 
mercenary.  He wanted the DOT pamphlet to stress “the 
importance of this new cultural approach to China, not merely for 
business reasons but more because there is some point in being a 
gentleman.” (A phrase which echoes the call of Russell and Black 
in 1927).112 
 Whatever the aim, the DOT was favourable and anxious 
that any document would be under their control “in order to 
prevent any tendency to go the other extreme, namely, one of 
sentiment, overlooking the realities of certain Chinese 
delinquencies.”113  Sir John Pratt at the Foreign Office was most 
enthusiastic, (and so he should have been, for at this moment his 
brother, better known as Boris Karloff, was playing the title role 
in The Mask of Fu Manchu, one of a series of films which, 
through the invention of certain Chinese delinquencies, did little 
110 Beale to Crowe, Private, 13/6/32, BT 60/31/5. 
111 “Memorandum by Mr G.E. Hubbard”, pp. 2-3, BT 60/31/5/1. 
112 Hughes to Crowe, 15/12/32, BT 60/31/5/65.  This was characteristic of Hughes 
who had given up evangelical missionary work because he felt unable to refute 
suggestions that the mission enterprise, as it stood, was the “running dog” of 
Imperialism, Council for World Mission Archives, China, Fukien, Box 15, File 1, E.R. 
Hughes to F.H. Hawkins 8/2/29.  Hughes moved to the Shanghai YMCA and later left 
the missionary world altogther and became Reader in Chinese religion and philosophy 
in the University of Oxford and the author of such books as The Invasion of China By 
the Western World (London, 1937). 
113 Farrer Minute 6/7/32, BT 60/31/5/1. 
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to soothe Sino-Western relations).114  An unofficial committee 
of academics and businessmen was brought together and their 
reaction was generally favourable.  Leefe, for Mathesons, 
identified the problem as: 
 
a tendency for youngsters arriving out in China to 
be either entirely unreceptive of the point of view 
of the native and to condemn every overture by 
them as requiring either an ignominious kowtow 
from us -... - or else to go the other extreme and in 
an impulsive effort to get a reputation for breadth 
of mind and condemn the institutions of their own 
country.115 
A meeting was held at the DOT in September which included the 
usual China worthies.116  Two things came of this, an offer from 
the sometime President of this Society, Sir Edward Denison Ross, 
Director of the School of Oriental Studies from 1916 to 1937, to 
run “Special Courses of Study for Commercial Students” and 
instructions to Consul A.G.N. Ogden to write a pamphlet.117 
 The School had had less commercial support in the 1920s 
than it expected after its creation in 1917, despite the involvement 
of the China Association in funding Chinese studies.118  Numbers 
of students of Chinese peaked in 1923-4 but ever after they 
dropped, as a result of events in China and the depression, getting 
as low as 28 ten years later.  In 1928 the School had run, for the 
first time, a special 3 month course for students sent by BAT, 
which was revising its use of foreign staff in China and needed 
trained linguists.119  They were sent to London and then to the 
114 Halliwell’s Film Guide, L. Halliwell, 7th Ed. (London, 1990), p. 383. 
115 Leefe to Crowe, 29/8/32, BT 60/31/5/18. 
116 Including Crowe, Sir Charles Addis, Arthur Balfour, Robert Waley Cohen, 
Hughes, E.M. Gull (secretary of the China Association) Stanley Dodwell and Pratt: 
“Minutes of a Meeting Held at the Department of Overseas Trade in 13th September 
1932 to Discuss Anglo-Chinese Relations”, BT 60/31/5/35. 
117 Sir E. Denison Ross to Crowe, 14/11/32, BT 60/31/5/59a; A.G.N. Ogden, draft 
booklet, BT 60/31/5/70a, 1/2/33, . 
118 Through the association’s Incorporated School of Practical Chinese, see SOAS - 
China Association - CHAS S.I.3. 
119 School of Oriental Studies, Report of the Governing Body and Statement of 
Accounts, 1928. 
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North China Union Language School in Beijing for a year.  
The effects of the London course are hard to quantify but one of 
the group felt that these once a week lessons only taught him the 
inadvisability of learning Mandarin in central London.120  Still, 
two members of that course were later to write excellent memoirs 
about China, so that might point to some sort of success.121 
 In 1929 Commercial Certificates were awarded for the first 
time.  Chartered Bank employees were prominent in receiving 
them.  The School felt that its proper Chinese research suffered 
because the greater proportion of its students were on crash 
courses in basic Mandarin.122  Not much seems to have come of 
the Denison Ross proposal although BAT and Swires sent a 
steady flow of people to the School after the mid-1930s.123 
 Whether the special courses would have produced Hughes’ 
gentlemen is another question.  One of the BAT draft certainly 
considered himself more interested and friendly towards the 
Chinese than most of his contemporaries but this had more to do 
with falling in love with a China-born English woman on the boat 
out, than any course at SOS.124 
 The booklet is actually quite good.  Ogden’s original text 
was fair but needed toning down to avoid unhelpful comments 
about the “ingrained” propensity of the Chinese to squeeze and 
lamenting the declining “general standard of commercial 
morality” among Chinese businessmen.125  Hughes supplied 
chapters on Chinese history and culture and the Royal Institute of 
120 Maurice Lister, “Memoir”, p. 16. 
121 John Logan, China: Old and New (Hong Kong, 1982), Maurice Lister, 
“Memoir”, unpublished. 
122 Report of the Advisory Committee together with other Documents respecting the 
China Indemnity (London, 1926), pp. 152-53. 
123  12 from BAT and 18 from Swires were registered from 1934 to 1936: SOAS 
CHAS S.I.3 Annual Reports 1934-35 to 1937-38. 
124 Maurice Lister, personal communication. 
125 Ogden, draft booklet, paras.  19, 17, BT 60/31/5/70a. 
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International Affairs a bibliography.  It compares very 
favourably with the only other special guide I have found, the 
anonymous 1928 War Office Pamphlet Notes on Shanghai.  How 
on earth the War Office and Legation expected its officers to 
retain a balanced view of things in Shanghai is hard to see, given 
a bibliography which recommended Gilbert’s What’s Wrong with 
China, Auxion De Ruffe’s Is China Mad? and, for history, Bland 
and Backhouse’s colourful but unreliable China Under the 
Empress Dowager.  In an appendix entitled “Some Chinese 
Characteristics”, echoing the Reverend Smith’s famous book of 
the same name, it was announced that the Chinese mind was 
passive, the Chinese ignorant and gullible, selfishly individualist 
and “out of step with the world.”126  It’s hardly surprising then, 
that most of the papers of military men that I have examined 
show them to be firmly in favour of harsher policies towards 
China than were ever employed.127 
 
In Conclusion 
 Ultimately all of this propaganda was wasted.  It kept 
people like O.M. Green and Lionel Curtis employed but 
throughout the 1930s the reputation of Shanghai’s foreign 
community got worse.  Despite such genuine SMC innovations as 
the belatedly discovered interests in Chinese primary education in 
1929 and public health in 1937 the old clichés stuck.128  In 1933 
Mrs Cecil K. Chesterton devoted a section of her Young China 
126 Notes on Shanghai (London, 1928), IOLR L/MIL/17/20/6. 
127 Ignorance about China was, of course, hardly confined to the military.  There 
was actually a great deal of information in print and being disseminated about China in 
the 1920s but it could do little to combat, and indeed often fuelled, the erroneous or 
picturesque images of the Chinese peddled by sensationalist playwrights and novelists 
or the propagandists of the treaty ports.  These images are discussed in detail in my 
“Changing British Attitudes to China and the Chinese, 1928-1931”, (Unpublished Ph.D.  
thesis, University of London, 1992), chapter 2, pp. 29-77. 
128 Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin, pp. 14-18. 
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and New Japan to the “Shanghai Mind”, and to the “No Dogs 
and Chinese” sign; much to the satisfaction of a reviewer in the 
Listener and the annoyance of the North China Daily News which 
declared that her “qualifications for putting any mind into the 
dock are obviously negligible.”129  John Blofeld restated many of 
the standard complaints about behaviour in the 1920s and 1930s 
in a lecture to this Society in 1946.130  From Hergé’s Tintin to 
Edgar Snow the best-selling writers were very critical of the 
foreign population of China.  The best-selling of them all, Pearl 
Buck, ignored them completely in her fiction which, beginning 
with The Good Earth [1931], brought to life the inhabitants of the 
“rest” of China to such effect that it dominated Western attitudes 
to the country for two decades afterwards.131  The foreign 
community in Shanghai truly became the irrelevance it had 
always really been in the wider context of China.  The Japanese 
actions after 1931 and the Undeclared War after 1937 left the 
foreign communities in China on the sidelines and in suspension, 
a suspension that lasted until the real powerful forces at work in 
the country fought themselves out. 
 On top of this a series of salacious books sealed the city’s 
reputation, and have continued to.  Who remembers or has read 
Green’s 1943 propaganda panegyric, The Foreigner in China, 
with its chapters on Jordan, Hart, Gordon, Green’s own servants 
and pidgin-English.  Much more fun is to be had in Egon Kirsch’s 
Secret China [1935], Hauser’s Shanghai: City for Sale [1940] and 
Miller’s Shanghai: Paradise of Adventurers [1937].  These books 
have helped to erect a wall of legend around the city and its 
foreign inhabitants which makes it difficult to approach.  
129 NCH, 25/10/33, p. 124. 
130 John Blofeld, Sino-British Cultural Relations: Report of an address by Mr John 
Blofeld, (China Society: London, 1947). 
131 Harold Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India 
(New York, 1958), pp. 155-58. 
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Fictional works have had a similar effect.  Harriet Sergeant’s 
recent book, Shanghai [1991], seems to have fallen into this trap.  
I think I have shown that this should not be surprising; foreign 
Shanghai has long had an image problem and serious attempts 
were made to change it, or at least to curtail the effects of it at 
times of political necessity.   
 The real problem was one of interpretation which foreign 
Shanghai was bound to lose over time.  Our values today and 
relationships with other cultures have, at least publicly, improved 
immensely since the 1920s.  It is easy to sound “unfair” about the 
Shanghai British but the social reality of that “place in time” has 
vanished; and now these myths are all that is left of it outside the 
academic histories. 
